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Abstract
Price dispersion is analyzed in the context of a queuing market where
customers enter queues to acquire a good or service and may experience
delays. With menu costs, price dispersion arises and can persist in the
medium and long run. The queuing market rations goods in the same way
whether ﬁrm prices are optimal or not. Price dispersion reduces the rate at
which customers get the good and reduces customer welfare.
∗The author is indebted to Guillaume Rocheteau, Robert Shimer and participants at the
Search session of the Society for Economic Dynamics meetings June 28-30, 2002.1. Introduction
This paper analyzes price dispersion in a queuing market where customers may
experience delays in waiting to be served. The price dispersion arises and per-
sists because queue lengths compensate for price diﬀerences, and ﬁrms limit price
changes in response to menu costs. The paper considers consequences of price dis-
persion for arrival rates, eﬃciency and consumer welfare. Queue rationing occurs
through customer choice of queues rather than price adjustment. It operates in
the same manner whether the economy’s equilibrium is short run (with arbitrary
and possibly suboptimal ﬁrm prices), medium run (with optimal ﬁrm prices but
with ﬁrm proﬁts and losses) or long run (with optimal prices and zero proﬁts).
The queuing market considered here is an extension of Sattinger (2002), which
analyzed medium and long run equilibria in the absence of price dispersion.1 This
paper diﬀers from the earlier paper by introducing menu costs, which explain how
price dispersion can arise and persist.2 It also extends the description of queue
rationing with price dispersion to the short run.
The major conclusions are as follows. With menu costs, price dispersion can
arise in short, medium and long run equilibria. Price dispersion causes ineﬃciency
in a queuing market by reducing the aggregate rate at which customers in the
market get the good or service. The queuing mechanism allocating goods or
services to customers operates whether or not ﬁrm prices are in equilibrium (i.e.,
are optimal for ﬁrms). Price dispersion and disequilibrium then have minimal
consequences for the operation of a queuing market, in contrast to standard market
models.
The basic results from a single price queuing market equilibrium (without
menu costs) are as follows. Consider a market in which customers acquire a good
or service by waiting in a queue at a ﬁrm. Let α be the arrival rate of customers
at ﬁrms, and let σ be the rate at which customers in a queue are serviced or
provided with the good. Then ρ = α/σ is the erlang or traﬃci n t e n s i t y ,a n d1−ρ
is the expected proportion of time a ﬁrm is idle (with no customers in line). The
expected number of customers in a ﬁrm’s queue is ρ/(1 − ρ), and the average
rate at which customers in the market get the good or service is σ − α.3 Firms
1Queuing theory is treated in Cox and Smith, 1961; Feller, 1957; Karlin, 1966; Karlin and
Taylor, 1981; Saaty, 1961; and Taylor and Karlin, 1984.
2See Andersen, 1994, for a review of the menu cost literature.
3Sattinger (2002, p. 536) refers to σ − α as the rate at which a customer already in a queue
gets the good. Guillaume Rocheteau points out that customers already in a queue will experience
diﬀerent rates.
2and customers have a common interest rate r. The good or service deteriorates
at the rate µ. A customer chooses a queue on the basis of the expected value of
being in the queue, which equalizes the expected value across ﬁrm queues even if
price diﬀerences are present. Let VNG be the expected value of being in a queue.
Solving the asset value equations for a customer moving between having the good
and not having the good yields
VNG =
(σ − α)(φ − (r + µ)P) − ω(r + µ)
r(r + µ + σ − α)
(1.1)
where φ is the value of the good to customers and ω is the cost to customers of
being in the market. The steady state arrival rate α is such that ﬂows of customers
getting the good equal ﬂows of customers entering the market to get the good,
and is given by
α =
Ã













where NC is the measure of customers and NF is the measure of ﬁrms. Firms
optimally choose a price to maximize expected proﬁts subject to the response of
t h ea r r i v a lr a t ea tt h eﬁrm that yields the same value of VNG as at other ﬁrms. If
a ﬁrm charges price Pi, its arrival rate would be
αi = α(Pi,V NG)=σ −
(r + µ)(rVNG + ω)
φ − (r + µ)Pi − rVNG
(1.3)
The expected proﬁtr a t eo faﬁrm charging price Pi is
π = αi(Pi − C) − k (1.4)
where C is the cost of producing the good and k is the cost per period of being
in the market. The optimal price is given by
P = C +
α(φ + ω − (r + µ)C)
(r + µ)σ +( σ − α)2 (1.5)
This price equalizes the slopes of the customer indiﬀerence and ﬁrm isoproﬁt
curves between arrival rate and price.
Various forms of disequilibrium can arise involving adjustments to stochastic
changes, incomplete customer information about ﬁrm expected queue lengths or
pricing, and unequal customer values of entering ﬁrm queues. For the purposes of
3this paper, a short run equilibrium is deﬁned as occurring when the expected value
of entering a ﬁrm’s queue is the same for all ﬁrms. However, in the short run,
ﬁrms may not have adjusted their prices optimally to current market conditions.
The short run therefore describes a market with optimal customer responses to
potentially suboptimal ﬁrm pricing. The medium run occurs when ﬁrms have
adjusted prices to current steady-state conditions but have not made entry and
exit decisions in response to proﬁts or losses. The long run occurs when, in
addition to medium run conditions, ﬁrms are making zero proﬁts and seek neither
to enter nor to exit.
The next section describes how menu costs can generate price dispersion in the
queuing market. Section 3 shows how dispersion in prices leads to dispersion in
arrival rates so that the expected value of queuing at diﬀerent ﬁrms is the same.
The section shows the eﬀects of price dispersion on the aggregate arrival rate,
eﬃciency and customer welfare. Section 4 draws conclusions about the role of
price dispersion in queuing markets.
2. Menu Costs and Price Dispersion
Equilibrium price dispersion can arise in the presence of menu costs. Let M be
the menu costs of changing the price. A price change must then raise the rate
of ﬁrm proﬁts by at least rM f o rap r i c ec h a n g et ob ep r o ﬁtable. The upper
and lower prices at which a price change is just proﬁtable can be found from the
condition 1.3 determining the arrival rate at a ﬁrm charging arbitrary price Pi, in
combination with the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function in 1.4. Substituting αi from 1.3 into
1.4 yields the ﬁrm’s proﬁts as a function of the price charged. This is shown in
Figure 2.1 using speciﬁc parametric values.4 Subtracting rM from the maximum
proﬁt level yields the horizontal line in Figure 2.1. At the intersections of the
horizontal line with the proﬁt curve, the proﬁt gain just equals the menu costs
per period. At prices between the vertical dashed lines, the ﬁrm would lose money
by changing the price and would therefore leave the price unchanged. At prices
outside the dashed lines, the ﬁrms could gain by changing the price.
The interval within which prices remain unchanged can be determined as a
function of the menu costs. Setting ﬁrm proﬁts (with αi determined by 1.3) equal
to proﬁts at the optimal price minus menu costs yields two solutions for the price,
corresponding to the upper and lower limits of the interval. Varying the menu
4The ﬁgure assumes σ =2 ,r= .1,µ= .2,φ=6 ,N C =1 0 0 ,N F =1 0 ,C=1 0 ,M=1 ,
ω =1 , and k =2 .








Figure 2.1: Firm Proﬁts Versus Price
5costs generates diﬀerent upper and lower limits within which prices would not be
changed. As menu costs increase, the interval grows, but not in proportion to the
menu costs. At menu costs close to zero, the interval grows rapidly, reﬂecting the
zero slope of the proﬁtf u n c t i o na tt h em a x i m u mp r o ﬁt in Figure 2.1. Negligible
menu costs can therefore permit a substantial amount of price dispersion. The
lower limit falls more rapidly than the upper limit rises as menu costs increase,
because high prices have greater proﬁt consequences than low prices.
The particular distribution of prices within an interval is not determined by
this static analysis. The optimal dynamic price setting strategy of a ﬁrm in a
stochastic environment, with arrival rates varying from period to period, would
not generally result in price changes exactly at the upper and lower limits shown
in Figure 2.1. However, the analysis establishes that price dispersion would not
be eliminated by ﬁrm proﬁt maximization in the presence of menu costs. The
dispersion could be relatively large even for small menu costs.
In a dynamic analysis of a queuing market, price changes would occur when
ﬁrms decide that proﬁti n c r e a s e sw o u l db es u ﬃcient to cover menu costs. Suppose
ﬁrms establish threshold positive and negative diﬀerences from the optimal price
at which they change prices.5 If the optimal price is declining, only ﬁrms at the
upper threshold would lower their prices. If the price is increasing, only ﬁrms at
the lower threshold would raise their prices. The density of ﬁrms at a given price
could be generated iteratively from the probabilities of threshold prices leading
ﬁrms to change to the given price. It is unlikely that average price changes would
be proportional to stochastic changes in numbers of customers, or that prices
would be uniformly distributed within a range.
3. Dispersion in Prices and in Arrival Rates
This section describes how the queuing market would operate with dispersion in
prices and arrival rates. The section then shows how equilibrium can be deter-
mined when there is price dispersion. Dispersion aﬀects the equilibrium by raising
the aggregate number of customers in line for a given average arrival rate. It re-
duces the proportion of customers with the good and makes customers worse oﬀ.
Aggregate ﬁrm proﬁts are reduced, mostly because of suboptimal prices; but a
5It is possible that depending on the stochastic behavior of the number of customers, ﬁrms
would not change prices within a range wider than when menu costs are exactly recovered. Also,
in a stochastic environment, ﬁrms would not necessarily change prices to the current optimal
level.
6ﬁrm charging the optimal price would make greater proﬁts. The optimizing prob-
lems facing ﬁrms and customers are substantially the same whether or not there
is dispersion.
Price dispersion aﬀects the queuing market through unequal arrival rates. If
there is a system with multiple queues that have the same service times (at super-
market check-out lines, for example), the expected aggregate number in the queues
will be minimized when the arrival rates at each queue are the same. Unequal
arrival rates raise the expected number waiting. This point can be demonstrated
as follows. As before, let αi be the arrival rate at ﬁrm i and suppose the com-
pletion rate σ i st h es a m ea ta l lﬁrms. Then the erlang or traﬃci n t e n s i t ya t
ﬁrm i is ρi = αi/σ. The expected number of customers in line for ﬁrm i is then









The reason for the inequality is the appearance of αi in the denominator, so that
when αi is above average, σ − αi is low and the ratio is boosted in value.7
In standard market models, allocation of goods from sellers to buyers is tied to
the price determination mechanism.8 In a queuing market, ﬁrm idle times recon-
cile market service capacity with customer arrival rates. This rationing mechanism
operates separately from the price determination process. A queue rationing al-
location can then be determined for an arbitrary distribution of prices. Deﬁne a
queue rationing allocation as occurring when queue lengths at ﬁrms equalize the
value of entering each ﬁrm’s queue and the aggregate arrival rate equalizes ﬂows
of customers into and out of the market. A queue rationing allocation contin-
ues indeﬁnitely until ﬁrms change their prices, or until some other change in the
6Since the number in line at one ﬁrm is not independent of the number in line at another
ﬁrm, summing the expected numbers in line does not necessarily yield the expected aggregate
number in line. However, it will be approximately the same and will be taken to equal the
expected aggregate number for purposes of the analysis here.
7This inequality can ﬁrst be shown for two ﬁrms. Suppose α =( α1 +α2)/2,w i t hα1 and α2







2α(σ − α)+( α1 − α2)2/2
(σ − α)2 − ((α1 − α2)/2)2
This exceeds 2α/(σ − α) whenever α1 6= α2. The inequality can then be established for any
number of ﬁrms by sequential averaging.
8See Carlton (1989) for a review of market clearing.
7market occurs (e.g., the number of customers increases or the number of ﬁrms
decreases). The queue rationing allocation with price dispersion is determined as
follows. As before, let Pi be the price charged by ﬁrm i, i =1 ,...,NF. As in (1.3),
let α(Pi,V NG) be the arrival rate at ﬁrm i such that a customer would achieve
asset value VNG when the price is Pi, found by solving 1.1 for α.9
The queue rationing allocation given the prices will be determined by the
intersection between two relations. The ﬁrst relation arises from the equality
between the aggregate number of arrivals at ﬁrms and the rate at which customers
w i t ht h eg o o de x p e r i e n c eab r e a k d o w no ft h eg o o d( o rn e e dt oh a v et h es e r v i c e
renewed):




where NCG is the number of customers with the good and NCNG is the number
of customers without the good. Then




Since the arrival rate must be lower to yield a higher customer asset value for a
given price, NCNG in 3.3 will be an increasing function of VNG.
For the second relation, consider the sum of the expected numbers of customers





σ − α(Pi,V NG)
(3.4)
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9For some values of Pi and VNG, the arrival rate α(Pi,V NG) will not lie between zero and
the service rate σ.
8Thus Q depends only on the average price and is a decreasing function of VNG.
The queue rationing allocation occurs when the number waiting in line, Q,e q u a l s
the number of customers without the good, NCNG. This determines VNG,w h i c h
in turn determines the arrival rates at each ﬁrm and each ﬁrm’s proﬁts. In this
way, conditions in a queuing market for an arbitrary distribution of prices can be
found.
Using the parameter values from Figure 2.1, the two relations determining
VNG and the proportion without the good are shown in Figure 3.1, which will
later be used to show the eﬀects of increasing dispersion. The downward sloping
curve labeled Q arises from 3.5. For a particular distribution of prices (e.g., for
dispersion parameter δ = .10, to be deﬁned shortly), the upward sloping curve
arises from 3.3. At the intersection, the expected number in the queue, Q, equals
the number of customers without the good.
Now consider the eﬀect of increasing dispersion on the equilibrium. Suppose
Pi = P(1 − δ/2) + (i − 1)Pδ/(NF − 1),i=1 ,...,NF (3.6)
Thus the average price is P and ﬁrm prices run from P(1−δ/2) to P(1+δ/2).T h e
number of customers in line, Q, depends only on the average price P and therefore
the relation between Q and VNG does not shift as δ increases. However, the relation
3.3 shifts upward when dispersion δ increases.10 Thus greater dispersion yields a
l o w e rc u s t o m e ra s s e tv a l u eVNG and a higher proportion of customers without the
good. Aggregate ﬁrm proﬁts decline because some ﬁrms are choosing suboptimal
prices. However, a ﬁrm charging the average price P would experience a greater
arrival rate and a higher proﬁt, since α(P,VNG) increases as VNG goes down.
The eﬀect of increasing price dispersion is shown in Figure 3.1. The three
upward sloping curves show NCNG as a function of VNG, from 3.3. The curve
with δ =0yields the values of VNG and NCNG in a single price equilibrium. As δ
i n c r e a s e st o0 . 1 0a n dt h e nt o0 . 1 5 ,VNG declines and NCNG increases. Figure 3.2
shows the eﬀect of dispersion on the customer asset value, VNG. Starting from
the single price equilibrium, an increase in dispersion initially has no eﬀect on
customer asset value (or the number of customers waiting in line). Only when
dispersion goes beyond a negligible level does customer asset value begin to fall
noticeably.
10This can be shown by considering the sum of the pair α(Pi,V NG)+α(Pj,V NG),w h e r e
j = NF − i, and i<N F/2.T h e nPi +Pj =2 P. It can then be shown that the sum of the pair
increases as δ increases, so that
PNF
i=1 α(Pi,V NG) increases as δ increases.
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Figure 3.1: Queue Rationing Allocation with Price Dispersion
10Price dispersion generates ineﬃciency in the queuing market.11 It increases the
number of customers waiting in line for a given average arrival rate. Whatever
the average price charged by ﬁrms, the number of customers waiting in line will
be minimized, and the customer asset value will be maximized, at the single price
equilibrium. Since the proportion of customers with the good increases, the arrival
rate of customers in the market decreases, and production declines when there is
price dispersion.
Despite this ineﬃciency, the behavior of ﬁrms and customers in the queuing
market is substantially unaﬀected by price dispersion. Firms continue to face a
choice of prices and arrival rates arranged along a customer indiﬀerence curve,
as they do in the single price equilibrium. Customers face alternative price and
arrival rate combinations, unlike the single combination in the single price equi-
librium. However, if customers are identical, they are indiﬀerent between the
combinations available. The queuing market with price dispersion therefore op-
erates in substantially the same way as in a single price equilibrium. If price
dispersion is small, the outcomes are also substantially the same.
4. Conclusions
As observed initially by George Stigler (1961, 1962), goods and labor markets are
respectively characterized by price and wage dispersion. The dispersion provides
agents with incentives to engage in search. A substantial literature has evolved
to explain how price dispersion can arise in the ﬁrst place, in violation of the Law
of One Price. Search theory provides an explanation of how search and matching
frictions, with incomplete information, can generate price or wage dispersion in
equilibrium (Reinganum, 1979; Burdett and Judd, 1983; Rob, 1985; Bester, 1988).
However, simplifying assumptions and necessary conditions for equilibrium impose
restrictions on the equilibrium distributions (Butters, 1977; Sattinger, 1991; Bur-
dett and Mortensen, 1998; Arnold, 2000; Mortensen and Wright, 2002).
The queuing model with menu costs provides an alternative explanation of
how price dispersion can arise and persist. In the standard supply and demand
model with complete and costless information, any diﬀerences in price would lead
all customers to choose the ﬁrm with the lower price. In search models, some
customers do not know speciﬁc ﬁrms with lower prices and optimally choose ﬁrms
11The ineﬃciency appears by comparison with the single price queue rationing allocation.
Given the menu costs of price changes, ineﬃciency does not imply that an improvement in the
market is possible through elimination of dispersion.






















Figure 3.2: Eﬀect of Dispersion on Customers
with higher prices. In the queuing model, optimal customer behavior generates
longer expected queues at ﬁrms with lower prices, so that ﬁrms with higher prices
continue to get customers. Customer behavior therefore does not force the elimi-
nation of price dispersion. Since queue length (and ﬁrm idle time) adjust to price,
ﬁrms have little proﬁt incentive to adjust suboptimal prices. With menu costs,
there will be a range of prices within which ﬁrms would not adjust their prices.
Price dispersion would then persist in medium and long run equilibrium.
To some extent, elementary queuing phenomena have been incorporated into
search theory and matching frictions (e.g., when two workers apply for the same
vacancy, causing further delay to one of the workers in ﬁnding a job).12 There is
a potential for combining formal queuing and search theories. If customers base
choices on actual queue length, stochastic variation in queue lengths provides a
natural motivation for search behavior even without price dispersion.
12Robert Shimer (2001) incorporates queuing theory in an analysis of the assignment of het-
erogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs.
12References
[1] Andersen, Torben M. Price Rigidity. Causes and Macroeconomic Implica-
tions. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994.
[2] Arnold, Michael A. “Costly Search, Capacity Constraints, and Bertrand
Equilibrium Price Dispersion,” International Economic Review,V o l .4 1 ,N o .
1, 2000, pp. 117-131.
[3] Bester, H. “Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Dispersion,”
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 55, 1988, pp. 201-214.
[4] Burdett, K. and Judd, K.L. “Equilibrium Price Dispersion,” Econometrica,
Vol. 51, 1983, pp. 955-969.
[5] Burdett, Kenneth, and Mortensen, Dale. “Wage Diﬀerentials, Employer Size,
and Unemployment,” International Economic Review, Vol. 39, 1998, pp. 257-
273.
[6] Butters, G. “Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices,” Re-
view of Economic Studies, Vol. 44, 1977, pp. 465-491.
[7] Carlton, Dennis W. “The Theory and the Facts of How Markets Clear: Is In-
dustrial Organization Valuable for Understanding Macroeconomics?” Chap-
ter 15, pp. 909-946 in: Handbook of Industrial Organization,V o l .I ,e d i t e db y
Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1989.
[8] Cox, D. R. and Smith, Walter L. Queues. John Wiley, New York, 1961.
[9] Feller, William. An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications,
Volume I, second edition. John Wiley, New York, 1957.
[10] Karlin, Samuel. A First Course in Stochastic Processes.A c a d e m i cP r e s s ,N e w
York, 1966.
[11] Karlin, Samuel and Taylor, Howard M. A Second Course in Stochastic
Processes. Academic Press, New York, 1981.
[12] Mortensen, Dale and Wright, Randall. “Competitive Pricing and Eﬃciency
in Search Equilibrium,” International Economic Review, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2002,
pp. 1-20.
13[13] Reinganum, Jennifer. “A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion,”
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87, 1979, 851-858.
[14] Rob, R. “Equilibrium Price Distributions,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol.
52, 1985, pp. 487-504.
[15] Saaty, Thomas L. Elements of Queuing Theory, McGraw-Hill, New York,
1961.
[16] Sattinger, Michael. “Consistent Wage Oﬀer and Reservation Wage Distribu-
tions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991, pp. 277-288.
[17] –––––––. “A Queuing Model of the Market for Access to Trading
Partners,” International Economic Review, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 533-547.
[18] Shimer, Robert. “The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with
Coordination Frictions,” NBER Working Paper 8501, October 2001.
[19] Stigler, George. “The Economics of Information,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, Vol. 68, No. 3, 1961, pp. 213-225.
[20] –––––––. “Information in the Labor Market,” Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 70, No. 5, Supplement, 1962, pp. 94-105.
[21] Taylor, Howard M. and Karlin, Samuel. An Introduction to Stochastic Mod-
eling. Academic Press, Orlando, 1984.
14